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of Things Networks 
Baraq Ghaleb, Ahmed Al-Dubai, Elias Ekonomou, Mamoun Qasem, Imed Romdhani and Lewis Mackenzie
Abstract— In RPL routing protocol, the DAO (Destination 
Advertisement Object) control messages are announced by the child 
nodes to their parents to build downward routes. A malicious 
insider node can exploit this feature to send fake DAOs to its 
parents periodically, triggering those parents, in turn, to forward 
the fake messages upward  to the root node.  In this study, we show 
how this behavior can have a detrimental side effect on the 
performance of the network, increasing power consumption, latency 
and reducing reliability. To address this problem, a new scheme is 
introduced to mitigate significantly the effect of the DAO attack on 
network performance. 
 
Index Terms— Internet of Things, Low-power and Lossy 
Networks, RPL Security, DAO Attack.  
I. INTRODUCTION1 
Recently, the Low-power and Lossy Networks (LLNs), a 
collection of interconnected tiny sensor nodes, have been 
considered one of the key enabling blocks of the ever-growing 
Internet of Things paradigm [1] [2]. Due to their scarce 
resources, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has 
specified  the IPv6 Routing Protocol for LLN (RPL) [3] as the 
routing standard for such networks [3][4][5]. Since it was a 
proposal, the RPL’s security aspects have been analyzed by 
several research efforts reporting the existence of multiple 
security concerns that need to be addressed in order to facilitate 
the adoption of the protocol in a wide range of applications 
[6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14]. One of such security concerns 
is the DAO (Destination Advertisement Object) attack, where a 
compromised node sends periodic DAO messages to its parent 
nodes forcing them, in turn, to flood the network with DAO 
messages, an action that can severely harm energy efficiency, 
latency and reliability of the entire network. In fact, unlike other 
control-based attacks, DAO messages are transmitted in end-to-
end fashion, from the sensor node toward the root (the details of 
the exact mechanisms are explained in Section II), so the level of 
damage is not restricted to the local scope of the attacker. Indeed, 
a DAO message sent by a child leaf node located on the edge of 
the network will trigger network-wide DAO transmissions 
because the DAO must be forwarded by every intermediate 
parent between that child and the network root affecting network 
performance and consuming its resources [3][15]. To address 
this issue, a new simple, yet effective solution has been proposed 
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in this article with the goal to mitigate the effect of DAO insider 
attack on the performance of RPL’s IoT networks. The acquired 
results carried out by means of simulation experiments have 
demonstrated the capacity of the proposed solution in mitigating 
the attack and almost restoring back the perceived efficiency of 
RPL in terms latency, overhead, energy consumption and packet 
delivery ratio.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
gives a brief overview of the RPL protocol highlighting its 
routing mechanism to build downward routes. Section III 
introduces a description of the DAO attack, analyzing its effect 
on the network. The proposed mitigation mechanism is 
introduced in Section IV. The detail of the protocol evaluation 
and discussion is in Section V, while Section VI concludes the 
paper and discusses future work. 
II. RPL ROUTING PROTOCOL OVERVIEW 
A. RPL Topology and Operations 
  RPL organizes its physical network into a form of Directed 
Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) where each DAG is rooted at a single 
destination and is referred to as a Destination-Oriented DAG 
(DODAG) in RPL’s terms [3][4][5]. RPL uses the term upward 
routes to refer to routes that carry the traffic from normal nodes 
to the LBR whereas routes that carry the traffic from the 
DODAG root to other nodes are called the downward routes [3]. 
To facilitate the upward traffic pattern, a DODAG topology 
centered at the network root must be constructed. In such a 
topology, each non-root node willing to participate in upward 
communication must select one of its neighbors to act as that 
node’s default route (DODAG parent) towards the root [3]. The 
construction of the DODAG starts with the root multicasting 
control messages called DODAG Information Objects (DIOs) to 
its RPL’s neighbors. The DIOs carry the necessary routing 
information and configuration parameters required to build the 
DODAG [3][4].  An RPL node receiving a multicast DIO 
message will: (1) add the sender address to its candidate parent 
set; (2) calculate its distance (rank) with respect to the DODAG 
root based on the rank of that candidate parent, routing 
information advertised; (3) setup its default route (preferred 
parent); and (4) update the received DIO with its own rank and 
multicast it to other neighboring nodes, enabling them, in turn, to 
perform the previous operations [3][4]. 
To enable bi-directional communication, downward routes 
also need to be constructed. This is achieved by deploying 
another type of ICMPv6 control messages, namely, the 
Destination Advertisement Object (DAO). An RPL node willing 
to announce itself as a reachable destination from the root point 
of view, unicasts a DAO to its preferred parent advertising its 
own destination prefix. The processing of the received DAO by 
the parent relies on the current mode of operation advertised in 
the DIO messages. To this end, RPL has specified two modes for 
 creating and maintaining downward routes, namely, storing 
(table-driven) and non-storing (source routing) [3][4].  
In the storing mode, when a parent receives a DAO from one 
of its children, it: (a) stores the announced destination prefix 
locally in its routing table along with the DAO sender address, as 
the next hop to reach that destination; and (b) forwards the 
received DAO, in turn, to its own preferred parent to ensure the 
propagation of the advertised destination upward to the DODAG 
root [3][4]. This process is repeated by each intermediate node 
until the DAO is finally received by the DODAG root.  
In the non-storing mode of RPL, the same procedure is 
followed but a parent receiving a DAO does not store any 
routing state. Instead, it simply forwards the message to its own 
preferred parent until it is finally received by the DODAG root. 
Once the DODAG root receives the transmitted DAO, it records 
the source route of the intended destination for later use by the 
data-plane [3][4]. 
III. THE DAO ATTACK 
RPL uses DAO messages to build downward routes enabling 
bi-directional communication. The specification of RPL does not 
stipulate when and how often DAOs are transmitted. Thus, 
different implementations may opt to use different mechanisms 
to achieve this process. For instance, the study in [15] has opted 
to transmit periodically DAOs whereas the Contiki RPL 
implementation [16] transmits the DAO based on the trickle 
timers of DIOs. In Contiki RPL, a child node should unicast a 
DAO to its preferred parent on three occasions: 1) upon 
receiving a DIO from that parent; 2) upon changing its preferred 
parent; and 3) upon detecting some specific errors.  
An interesting point in this context is that the transmission of a 
DAO message by a child node will trigger the transmission of 
multiple DAOs proportional to the number of intermediate 
parent nodes between that child and the DODAG root.  An 
adversary can exploit this fact to harm the network by repeatedly 
and judiciously (to go undetected) transmitting DAOs to its 
parent node. A simple way to mount this attack is to replay an 
eavesdropped DAO from a legitimate node by an outsider 
triggering DAO forwarding upward by the node’s parents [14].  
This kind of attack can be mitigated using security services 
provided by the underlying layers or RPL itself such as MAC-
layer encryption and the cryptographic challenge-response 
handshake [14]. However, these mechanisms will not be 
sufficient to counter an attack where the attacker is an insider or 
compromised node [14]. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
In order to address a DAO insider attack in RPL, a new 
mechanism has been proposed, named SecRPL that restricts the 
number of forwarded DAOs by a parent. In fact, there are two 
options for how this restriction can be applied: the first is to 
restrict the entire number of forwarded DAOs regardless of the 
source node (i.e. the node who initiated the DAO); the second is 
to restrict the number of forwarded DAO per destination.  
Here we opt to use the second option, as the first option would 
result in blocking some DAOs coming from non-attacker nodes 
effecting negatively the quality of the downward paths. It may 
also result in DAOs of some nodes being blocked more than 
DAOs of some others. In particular, each parent node associates 
a counter with every child node in its sub-DODAG. When the 
number of forwarded DAOs for a child exceeds a pre-specified 
threshold, the parent discards any DAO message carrying the 
prefix of the respective child.  
To ensure that no node will be blocked due to the time factor, 
the counter is reset between each two consecutive DIOs. 
Specifically, when the parent node sends out a DIO message, the 
counters for all of its children are reset. 
Algorithm 1 : DAO Insider Attack Countermeasure 
1: procedure Initialization  
2:  set DAO_For_MAX  
3: end procedure 
 
 
4: procedure DIO Transmitted  
5:  For each child in the children list Then  
6:   child_DAO_Counter = 0  
7:  end for  
8: end procedure 
 
 
9: procedure  Child’s DAO  Received  
10:  if child_DAO_Counter  <  DAO_For_MAX Then  
11:   forward the DAO 
child_DAO_Counter ++ 
 
12:  else  
13:        discard the DAO  
14:  end if  
15: end procedure  
V. THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
To evaluate the effect of a DAO attack on the efficiency of the 
network and the performance of our proposed mechanism in 
mitigating that attack, we have conducted a set of experiments 
using Contiki (Contiki3.0), a lightweight and open-source 
operating system designed specifically for low-power resource-
constrained IoT devices [17]. Contiki features a highly optimized 
networking stack including several IoT standards such as CoAP, 
UDP, 6LoWPAN and IPv6. It also features implementations for 
RPL standard fundamental mechanisms. Cooja [18], a cross-
level simulator for Contiki, was used to carry out the simulation 
experiments, to emulate the exact binary code that runs on real 
sensor devices. Cooja incorporates an internal hardware emulator 
called MSPsim [19], which is used in our simulations, to emulate 
accurately (i.e. impose hardware constraints) the Tmote Sky 
platform, an MSP430-based board with an ultra-low power IEEE 
802.15.4 compliant CC2420 radio chip. We used the Unit Disk 
Graph Radio Medium (UDGM) radio protocol, the CSMA/CA 
protocol at the MAC layer and the ContikiMAC as a radio duty 
cycling (RDC) protocol. The ContikiRPL library was altered to 
implement the DAO attack on some nodes. In particular, we 
implemented the attack by means of malicious insider nodes 
programmed to transmit DAO messages to their preferred 
parents periodically at preconfigured fixed periods. A set of three 
malicious nodes running the DAO attack were used. At the 
application layer, we simulated a periodic data collection 
application where each node sends one packet to the sink every 
60 seconds (the time of sending is randomly chosen within the 
60 seconds period). The sink also sends a reply for each received 
packet to simulate the downward traffic. We have considered in 
our simulations a uniform distribution where 50 nodes are spread 
in a square area of 100m x100m. All nodes are static including 
the DODAG root, which is located outside the square area by a 
distance of 10 meters. We have selected three nodes at the 
 farthest edge from the root to act as malicious nodes to cover the 
majority of forwarding paths; this is what attacker might think of 
to harm the network widely. The number of allowed DAOs 
forwarded by a parent per child (DAOMax threshold) is set 10 
for our proposed mechanism. The rate in seconds at which the 
attacker sends DAO messages (attack interval) is varied between 
0.25 and 10 seconds. For each scenario, five simulation 
experiments with different seeds were run in order to get 
statistically valid results. The graphs below show the mean 
values of the results and the error bars at the 95% confidence 
interval of the mean. The simulation time was selected to be 
1800 virtual seconds for each experiment. The performance 
evaluation was based the following metrics. 
Number of DAOs Forwarded: is the average number of 
forwarded DAOs sent by the parent nodes in the network.  
Power Consumption (mW): is the average power consumption 
at the network’s nodes. 
Packet Delivery Ratio in the upward direction (Upward 
PDR): is the average ratio between the number of data packets 
sent out by the network nodes and the total number of data 
packets received at the root node. 
Packet Delivery Ratio in the downward direction (Downward 
PDR): is the average ratio between the number of packets 
received at the nodes and the total number of replies sent out by 
the root node. 
The Upward Latency (seconds), is the average end-to-end 
delay of all packets sent by the nodes and received successfully 
at the root. 
The Downward Latency (seconds), is the average end-to-end 
delay of all replies sent by the root and received at the nodes.   
We have evaluated the performance of RPL, InsecRPL (i.e. 
RPL under DAO attack), and SecRPL (i.e. RPL under attack 
with our proposed mitigation mechanism) in terms of previous 
mentioned metrics. Fig. 1 shows the average number of 
forwarded DAO messages per node under various attack 
intervals. The DAOMax threshold is set to 10 per destination. As 
can be observed in Fig. 1, both InsecRPL and SecRPL have 
registered a higher overhead in terms of forwarded DAOs 
compared to the reference model (RPL) which is proportional to 
the attack interval. However, Fig.1 also shows that SecRPL has 
registered much less overhead compared to the insecure version 
especially under heavy attack (attack interval of 250 
milliseconds). This also holds true within the case of energy 
consumption as shown in Fig. 2, which can be attributed to the 
mechanism of restricting the number of DAOs that can be 
forwarded by a parent per destination. Indeed, Fig. 2 shows that 
the InsecRPL has experienced a relatively high power 
consumption profile, which is much related to the increase in the 
DAO overhead. In fact, the power consumption profile in 
ContikiOS is calculated by adding up four components, the idle, 
listening, transmission and receiving.  Hence, the increase in the 
number of DAOs forwarded increases the power consumed by 
the forwarder nodes (transmission and receiving components). In 
addition, it affects the listening time of a forwarder’s children 
nodes, though they are not forwarders themselves, (listening 
component) by forcing them to listen for longer periods due to 
the congestion at that forwarder node.  
The upward and downward latencies of compared protocols 
are illustrated in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 respectively. Similarly, it is 
clear that the DAO attack has an adverse effect on the latency in 
both directions, which can be attributed again to the congestion 
induced by the attack at the forwarder nodes. 
In Fig. 5 and 6, we show the performance of the three 
protocols in terms of upward PDR and downward PDR 
respectively. The figures show that mounting the attack with a 
high attacking interval, affects negatively both the upward and 
downward traffic patterns (i.e. under this topology, in fact, the 
effect of attack may differ under different topologies or under 
different data traffic rates). This can be attributed mainly to the 
congestion incurred by the increase in the number of forwarded 
DAOs. This has been mitigated in the proposed solution, which 
registers PDRs comparable to that of  the reference model. 
 
Fig.  1 DAOs forwarding overhead under various attack intervals 
 
Fig.  2. Average power consumption under different attack intervals 
 
Fig.  3. The upward latency under various attack intervals 
 
Fig.  4. The downward latency under various attack intervals 
 
Fig.  5. The upward PDR under different attack rates 
 
  
Fig.  6. The downward PDR under different attack rates 
A. The Effect of the Threshold Parameter (DAOMax) 
Another point we study here is the effect of our mitigation 
mechanism on the reliability of networks in terms of packet 
delivery ratio. It is clear that setting the threshold value to a 
small number will minimize the energy consumption and control 
overhead but at the cost of reliability. This is illustrated in Figs. 5 
and 6. Fig. 5 shows that setting the DAO threshold Max to a very 
small value reduces both the energy consumption and control 
traffic overhead. However, as illustrated in Fig. 6, this results in 
a lower downward PDR for any threshold less than four while 
the upward PDR is not affected. This indicates that setting the 
DAOMax to a small value negatively affects only the downward 
traffic. In fact, setting the DAOMax to a small value will prevent 
the intermediate parent nodes from forwarding some critical 
DAO messages necessary to build downward routes, thus 
explaining the lower downward PDR.  
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Fig.  7. Power consumption and control overhead under various thresholds 
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Fig.  8. Downward and upward PDRs under various thresholds 
VI. CONCLUSION   
In this article, we have presented the DAO attack, which is 
triggered by having a malicious node send DAO control 
messages to its parent. This attack differs from other “hello-
based” exploits (such as DIS and DIO attacks) since DAO 
messages are transmitted in end-to-end fashion (i.e. from the 
sensor node to the root). Thus, the level of damage is not 
restricted to the local scope of the attacker. In fact, a DAO 
message sent by a child node located on the edge of the network 
will trigger network-wide DAO transmissions since DAO 
messages are forwarded by every intermediate parent between 
that child and the DODAG root. In addition, this kind of attack 
can be mounted simply without the need to compromise security 
keys from legitimate nodes. We have shown how this attack may 
significantly harm the performance of the network especially in 
terms of power consumption and reliability. Our experiments 
illustrate that DAO attacks significantly increase the control 
traffic overhead and power consumption while moderately 
affecting downward traffic reliability under the chosen 
assumptions. We have, further, proposed and assessed a 
mechanism to mitigate the effect of such an attack. 
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